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RECENT CASE NOTES
that a third person has an interest in the funds deposited, cannot apply those
funds to the indebtedness of the individual depositor, unless the bank has
changed its position, given value, or unless superior equities have been raised
in its favor.9 In these cases, there is no distinction, and apparently no cause
for distinction between an express trustee and an agent, bailee, collector of
rents, or anyone else in a fiduciary capacity.O Indiana follows this equitable
rule and there seems to be no doubt that it will continue to do so. The prin-
ciples which the Indiana courts follow are so well settled and deeply rooted
in the history of the cases that there is no question which rule precedent
points out. The reasoning of the Indiana Courts is that if the fund in
question is a trust fund, its character is not changed by a deposit to the
individual account of the trustee, and unless it has passed into the hands
of parties for value without notice, the court will separate the trust funds
from other funds, if there has been a co-mingling, and restore them to the
beneficiary."1 The point stressed in this line of authority is not lack of
knowledge or notice, but that the fund must have passed into the hands of
a party for value, a bona fide purchaser. It is to be noticed that the cases
which permit the set-off and refuse recovery do not take into consideration
this factor that value is given and that the holder is a bona fide purchaser.
Better reasoning would seem to favor the line of authority followed in
Indiana, as there is no reason for treating trust funds differently from other
trust property; and it should be possible for a beneficiary to follow the fund
until it does come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, at which
time a superior equity would arise in favor of that purchaser. Where the
bank has not changed its position or lost anything by the deposit which it
has attempted to apply to the trustee's indebtedness, there is no reason for
allowing the set-off, thus fostering a conversion of trust funds. And where
such set-off is attempted, it is such a conversion of trust funds as to bring
the case within the language of the Indiana rule, that the bank is liable
"if it participates in the profits or fruits of the fraud."12  R. K. R.
SacuRrY-DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEED.-In return for a sum then borrowed
a certain trust company took two notes that were secured by a single mortgage.
The notes were for $500 and $3,500 respectively and matured at the same
9 Brown v. Maqujres Real Estate Agency (1937, Mo.), 101 S. W. (2d) 41;
Allen Dudley & Co. v. First National Bank (1932), 122 Neb. 443, 240 N. W.
525; Agard v. Peoples National Bank (1927), 116 Minn. 438, 211 N. W. 825;
Gibbs v. Commercial & Savings Bank (1926), 50 S. D. 134, 208 N. W. 779;
Shotwell v. Sioux Falls Savings Bank (1914), 34 S. D. 109, 147 N. W. 288;
Cady v. South Omaha National Bank (1896), 46 Neb. 756, 65 N. W. 906;
Burtnett v. First National Bank (1878), 38 Mich. 630.
10 Central National Bank v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1881), 104 U. S.
54, 26 L. Ed. 409.
11Porter v. Roseman (1905), 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105; Pierce v.
Dill (1897), 149 Ind. 136, 48 N. E. 788; Citizen's Bank v. Harrison (1891),
127 Ind. 128, 26 N. E. 683; Bundy, Receiver, v. Town of Monticello (1882),
84 Ind. 119; Rottger, Receiver, v. First Merchants' National Bank (1933),
98 Ind. App. 139, 184 N. E. 267; Terra Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 94
Ind. App. 461, 181 N. E. 369; Continental National Bank v. McClure (1916),
60 Ind. App. 553, 111 N. E. 191; Shoppert v. Indiana National Bank (1907),
41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515.
12 Miami County Bank v. State (1915), 61 Ind. App. 360, 112 N. E. 40.
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date. Subsequently the larger of the two notes was assigned to the plaintiffs.
Still later the $500 note was transferred to the defendant. Upon default,
the plaintiffs sought to foreclose the mortgage contending that their note
should receive preference ,in the distribution of the proceeds because it was
first assigned. Held: As between notes maturing at the same date there
can be no preference arising by operation of law that is based upon the date
of assignment, but instead the holders thereof shall share pro-rata in the
proceeds of their common security.1
Indiana courts have held steadfastly to the rule that where a mortgage
is given to secure several notes maturing at different times, the notes are
entitled, in absence of some stipulation to the contrary, to priority of payment
from the proceeds of the mortgaged property in the order in which they
respectively become due.2 This rule of priority of the first maturing obliga-
tion is upheld regardless of the date of assignment.3 The only situation in
which the Indiana courts have broken away from the rule is where several
notes, executed at the same time, are given in the first instance to different
parties. In this situation the holders share pro-rata.4
The courts of this state in reaching these decisions have followed two
different theories. The first is that holders of notes maturing at different
times and secured by one mortgage are in fact successive mortgagees, the
holder of the first maturing obligation being the first mortgagee. 5  The
second theory is that since the holder of the earliest maturing obligation may
foreclose the security for payment of his debt as soon as it is in default, he
has priority accordingly. 6 In the principal case both notes matured on the
same date; consequently there could be no question of successive mortgages,
and the court properly allowed a pro-rata distribution of the proceeds of
the security.
In opposition to the Indiana court, some states have held that holders
of notes that are secured by one mortgage and fall due on different dates
share pro-rata in the security regardless of date of maturity or date of
assignment; 7 while other states hold -that the date of assignment fixes the
priorities in the security.8  Of the three positions, it seems that the one
allowing a pro-rata distribution regardless of date of maturity or date of
1 State Life Insurance Co. v. Oris H. Gast (1938), 13 N. E. (2d) 705.
2State Bank v. Tweedy (184-7), 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 447; Horn v. Bennet
(1893), 135 Ind. 158, 34 N. E. 321; Alden v. White (1904-), 32 Ind. App.
671, 67 N. E. 949.
3 Gerber v. Sharp (1880), 72 Ind. 553; Crouse v. Holman (1862), 19
Ind. 30; Murdock v. Ford (1861), 17 Ind. 52; Harris v. Harlan (1860),
14 Ind. 439.
4 Goodall v. Mopely (1874), 45 Ind. 3 5; Cain v. Hanna (1878), 63 Ind.
409; Moffit v. Roche (1881), 76 Ind. 75; Chaplin v. Sullivan (1890),- 128
Ind. 50, 27 N. E. 427.
5 Parkhurst v. Watertown Steam Engine Co. (1886), 107 Ind. 594, 8 N. E.
635.
6 Minor v. Hill (1877), 58 Ind. 176.
7 Smith v. Stevens (1881), 49 Conn. 181; Phelan v. Olvey (1856), 6 Cal.
480; Penzol v. Brookmire (1889), 51 Ark. 105, 10 S. W. 15; Holway v. Gilman
(1889), 81 Me. 185, 16 A. 543; Hall v. McCormick (1883), 31 Minn. 280, 17
N. W. 620.
8Richardson v. McKim (1878), 20 Kan. 346; Cullvan v. Erwin (1842)
4 Ala. 452; Lyman v. Smith (1867), 21 Wis. 681.
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assignment is the most expedient, and affords the most equitable distribution
of the proceeds from the security. This rule is predicated upon a much
more realistic premise than either of the others because it recognizes the
fact that the security was really given to protect all of the notes.
Sound reason and policy does not support the denial to a bona-fide holder
of such a note a proportionate share in the security solely because his note
matures at a later date than certain others or because his was later assigned
to him. The business significance of negotiable instruments has developed
to the place where a change in the Indiana rule would be highly beneficial in
lending more certainty to their payment in case of default, but the instant
case discloses no tendency in that direction. J. W. M.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TORT LIABuIrrY.-The representatives of the
deceased brought this action for the death of their son, drowned while bathing
in a swimming pool owned and operated by the city of Evansville. The
lower court held the city liable on grounds of negligence. On appeal, the
Supreme Court allowed appellant's motion for a new trial, on the grounds
that there was not sufficient evidence showing negligence. 1
At common law municipal corporations generally were immune from tort
liability. However, at the present time, the courts have ruled that while
the municipal corporation is not liable for torts committed by its agents in
the performance of governmental, political, or public functions it is liable
when the toiltis-comIiitted in the performance of corporate, private, or min-
isterial functions.2  This distinction has not proved entirely satisfactory,
and is difficult of application3-a fact which is driven home by the chaotic
condition of our existing law on this subject. In granting immunity, the
courts have held the operation and maintenance of the following to be gov-
ernmental functions: bridges, 4 public improvements, 5 parks and playgrounds,6
police,7 fire department,8 charitable trusts,9 and public health.JO Yet in
many of the same jurisdictions, the courts have held these same functions
to be corporate and have imposed liability in the following operations: streets
1 City of Evansville v. Blue (Ind. App., 1937), 8 N. E. (2nd) 426.
2 Borchards, E. M., Governmental Liability in Tort (1924-), 38 Yale L. J. 129.
3 Young v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. (1907), 126 Mo. App. 1,
103 S. W. 135: "The reasons given for liability and non-liability of municipal
corporations, we admit, are not logical or consistent. Some of the reasons
given for non-liability will apply just as forcibly to cases where liability is
asserted and vice versa."
4 Daly v. New Haven (1897), 69 Conn. 644, 38 A. 397.
5 Kippes v. Louisville (1910), 140 Ky. 423, 131 S. W. 104, 30 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 116.
6 Blair v. Granger (1902), 24- R. I. 17, 51 A. 1042.
7 Bartlett v. Columbs (1837), 101 Ga. 300, 28 S. E. 599.
8Aschoff v. Evansville (1904), 34 Ind. App. 25, 72 N. E. 279.
9 Frazer v. Chicago (1900), 186 Ill. 480, 57 N. E. 1055.
10 Evans v. Kankakee (1907), 23 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1190, note.
